Health Accounts and Other Welfare Accounts by Stefan Fölster et al.








n many countries increasing costs for health care
and sick leave insurance are forcing govern-
ments to cut back or implement higher user fees.
Germany and Sweden are just two recent exam-
ples. In many developing countries large segments
of the population are not covered by health insur-
ance at all. It is feared that universal coverage
places too large a burden on public expenditure.
This paper discusses health accounts as a way of
financing some of the costs of health care and at
the same time providing economic incentives to
use health care and sick leave insurance more effi-
ciently.In the course of this article we discuss some
basic principles of savings account based social
insurance and experience from other areas of
social policy.
Pension systems have been reformed in many
countries in recent years, moving from public, pay-
as-you-go schemes with defined benefits toward
systems in which contributions are deposited in a
notional or funded personal savings account.
Similar reforms for other types of social insurance
are much more modest. In Sweden, for example,
educational savings accounts are being implement-
ed voluntarily by some firms. In the U.S., the
Clinton Administration introduced medical sav-
ings accounts (MSAs) for the self-employed and
employees of small firms. MSAs combine retire-
ment-type savings with high-deductible health
insurance policies. As discussed below, as of sum-
mer 2003 there were proposals under discussion to
expand the scope of these medical accounts.
Unemployment savings accounts have been in
place in Brazil since 1986 (Cunningham 2000) and
have been introduced in Chile in 2002. Severance
pay systems such as exist in Italy, South Korea and
many other countries are also quite similar to
unemployment savings accounts.1
Proposals for more comprehensive savings account
based reforms have been argued (e.g. Fölster,
Gidehag, Snower & Orszag, 2002). An example of
a more comprehensive system in existence is the
Singaporean Central Provident Fund, originally
designed to increase savings and to provide retire-
ment security. It has since been extended with a
number of schemes, e.g. saving for medical needs,
financing of higher education, insurance of depen-
dents and a variety of other social needs.2
This paper gives an overview of the basic principles
behind savings-account based social insurance in
section 2. In section 3 health accounts are dis-
cussed. Finally, section 4 summarizes a few other
examples of savings account based social insur-
ance, including a comprehensive welfare account.
The basic principles behind welfare accounts
The basic idea of welfare accounts is that individu-
als make contributions to individual accounts. In
return, individuals’ welfare benefits are paid from
their accounts.The contributions may replace gen-
eral taxes by mandatory saving to finance the req-
uisite welfare benefits. In some systems the contri-
butions are voluntary,but are encouraged by lower
insurance premia or other incentives.
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Singaporean Provident Fund.The welfare accounts are hence like ordinary sav-
ings accounts with two key exceptions. First, to
avoid problems of moral hazard, there are restric-
tions on withdrawals from the welfare accounts.
And second, the welfare accounts also serve a
redistributive function, so that individuals receive
specific minimum welfare benefits regardless of
how low their account balances may be.In order to
enable individuals to use their welfare accounts to
perform their lifecycle redistributions, some types
of welfare accounts allow negative balances during
individuals’ working lifetimes, thereby enabling
them to shift purchasing power through time. In
accordance with the government redistributive
objectives, people with negative account balances
at the end of their working lives are eligible for
public support. For those people, the incentives to
work and save will inevitably be impaired, but var-
ious studies indicate that they may be expected to
be small in number in comparison with those who
have negative account balances in any particular
year. Since lifetime incomes are distributed more
equally than annual incomes, as noted, welfare
accounts tend to impair incentives of far fewer
people than do the traditional tax-based systems.
In order to motivate the introduction of welfare
accounts, we note that social insurance pro-
grammes involve a combination of savings, insur-
ance and redistribution. In traditional social insur-
ance programmes, this combination is often far
from transparent to the average consumer (or any-
one else, for that matter!). Individuals receive a
panoply of benefits, but neither the cost of each
nor the degree of cross-subsidy is transparent.
In addition to lack of transparency, another prob-
lem with traditional welfare systems is lack of flex-
ibility. Whereas private compensation and benefit
arrangements have moved increasingly towards
benefits that are responsive to individuals’ person-
al circumstances, public welfare benefits remain
relatively rigid in this regard. Single individuals
implicitly pay for insurance against spouses’ death,
while childless couples pay for education and ben-
efits for children they do not have.
The lack of transparency and flexibility in the tra-
ditional welfare systems have adverse incentive
effects, since individuals do not have to bear the
consequences of their own actions. If an individual
claims social insurance, it does not affect his or her
subsequent contribution rates. The costs of claim-
ing social insurance are thus not internalised and
as a result have excessive incentives to claim social
benefits.
Yet another major problem is that the benefits pro-
vided by traditional welfare systems are devoted,
in large part, to redistributions across individuals’
lifecycles, rather than to promoting income equali-
ty or providing insurance against adverse econom-
ic circumstances in a lifetime perspective.Lifecycle
redistributions – enabling income smoothing over
an individual’s lifetime – can be performed more
efficiently through comprehensive welfare
accounts than through traditional welfare bene-
fits.3A major insight in recent economic research is
that life-time income tends to be much more equal-
ly distributed than income in any particular year.
An OECD study on income mobility, for example,
indicates that the majority of individuals in the
lowest income quintile in 1986 had moved up five
years later (Sawyer, 1997). In fact, one in five had
moved up at least two quintiles. 4
Studies from several welfare states indicate that as
little as 20 to 25 percent of social transfers may
actually redistribute between individuals, while the
remaining 75 to 80 percent merely smoothes
income over the individual’s life cycle (Hussénius
and Sélen 1994; Fölster 1998). The taxes that need
to be levied to finance these transfers inevitably
distort economic incentives, reducing the incentive
to work, save and invest. In addition, the tax-and-
transfer systems are run by costly bureaucracies.
Thus, there could be substantial efficiency gains
from a reform that focuses public welfare provi-
sion on the 20 to 25 percent of current expenditure
devoted to the achievement of interpersonal redis-
tribution and social insurance against adverse eco-
nomic circumstances with significant lifetime
income implications.
When the welfare state was first introduced, family
structures were more uniform, benefits were more
basic and technology was simpler. In such a setting
it was both unnecessary to have differentiated ben-
efits and technologically not possible.Flexible ben-
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efits and transparency requires good and transpar-
ent information technology. While it would have
been inconceivable to implement a transparent,
flexible benefits policy in the interwar period or
even in the 1950s and 1960s, it is technologically
possible today.
In short,welfare accounts promise a number of sig-
nificant advantages over the traditional welfare
systems. In particular, by permitting the govern-
ment to focus on interpersonal redistribution and
social insurance against economic circumstances
with significant lifetime income implications, the
reform may allow substantial reductions in taxes
and thereby improve people’s incentives to work,
save, and invest. Furthermore, by helping people
internalize the social cost of their welfare expendi-
tures, welfare accounts discourage people from
making excessive welfare claims. In so doing, wel-
fare accounts also improve people’s incentive to
work.
Health accounts
In many countries the fraction of health costs that
patients pay themselves has been increased in
recent years. This development has often been
necessitated by a lack of public funds. But often it
is also seen as a way of reducing demand for health
care above and beyond what is medically neces-
sary.A problem with this approach has been, how-
ever, that a large fraction of families have almost
no liquid savings and find it hard to make even
small payments,especially if they are not anticipat-
ed. A risk is therefore that demand is cut even for
medically necessary treatment.
As a solution to this dilemma some economists
have recommended combinations of catastrophic
health insurance with individual health accounts.
The central idea is that individuals pay health care
costs below a certain deductible from the individual
health account; costs above the deductible are paid
by the insurance, which may be private or public.
The assets in the account belong to the individual.
Some countries,such as Singapore,have had health
accounts for many years. Other countries have
introduced similar elements covertly. In Sweden,
for example, individuals can receive credit to pay
for medication which has to be repaid at a later
date.
In the U.S.the President’s budget included two pro-
posals a tax-favored health account, which would
permit them to pay these out-of-pocket costs more
easily.They would also allow Americans to build up
an account to cover high medical costs when need-
ed.The first is to improve and expand medical sav-
ings accounts, removing excessive restrictions on
Medical Savings Accounts (Archer MSAs), trans-
forming them into a coverage option that is consis-
tent with recent trends in private health insurance.
Under the proposal, employees who have a health
plan with a significant deductible (up to $ 1,000 for
individuals and $ 2,000 for all other cases) could
deposit funds into the account, tax free, up to the
insurance policy’s deductible. The insurance plan
could cover preventive care without counting
against the deductible. Such plans are increasingly
common as employees have become dissatisfied
with restrictions on their care in HMO-style, low-
deductible plans. Employees who choose these
plans would still be protected against high medical
expenses with a more affordable premium than in a
low-deductible plan. The proposal would make
health accounts available to all employees, and
would not discriminate, as current law does, on the
basis of how many employees their employer has.
The MSA arrangement would be made a perma-
nent program in law, providing more incentives for
insurers, financial organizations, and others to
spend the start-up money and effort to create MSA
products and integrate them effectively with the
other health plan options they offer. The proposal
costs $ 5.7 billion over 10 years.
The second proposal are concerns so-called
Flexible Spending Accounts. Flexible Savings
Accounts (FSAs) are tax-free accounts that many
employers have set up to help give employees
more control over their medical expenses as well as
better protection against out-of-pocket spending.
However, FSAs are subject to an end-of-the-year
“use it or lose it” requirement that limits their
value for protecting against unexpected out-of-
pocket medical expenses. Under the proposal,
employees could roll over as much as $ 500 in
unspent health care contributions to an FSA for
use in the following year or to their 401(k) plan for
retirement income or health expenses at older
ages.The proposal costs $8 billion over 10 years.
A more comprehensive and perhaps more equi-
table proposal is based on our previous work inFölster, Gidehag, Orszag, and Snower (2003) and
Orszag and Snower (1997). Under this proposal
people would make mandatory minimum monthly
contributions to their health accounts, and the
resulting balances in these accounts would cover
both the deductible and the insurance premia.
People could voluntarily contribute more than the
specified minimum amounts to their accounts.
The deductible and premia are to be set in the mar-
ket, under competition between the public and pri-
vate sectors. To make such competitive possible,
public sector expenditures on health would be
financed solely from the payments people make
for public health services from their health
accounts. Thus the government could not use the
tax-transfer system to finance public health provi-
sion, artificially driving down prices of public
health services, and thereby discouraging private-
sector provision. Instead, the public and private
sectors would compete on an equal footing. Such
competition is particularly desirable in the health
service provision, since the public and private sec-
tors have different strengths and weaknesses in
these areas. For example, the government has the
advantage that it can trace people through the tax
system and thus can avoid monitoring costs and
default risks usually faced by private providers.
The private sector, for its part, is often better able
to provide more highly diversified services.
In order to prevent the private sector from ”cream-
skimming” (providing services only to those who
are unlikely to receive large payouts and leaving
the others to the public sector), private-sector
providers would be required to make their
deductibles and premia depend on only a restrict-
ed set of individual characteristics,such as people’s
age and income, and to ignore all others (such as
past medical history).
The government could meet its equity objectives
by redistributing income across people’s health
accounts, taxing the accounts of the accounts of
high earners and subsidizing the accounts of low
earners. However, as noted, these redistributions
would have to be of the balanced-budget variety:
economy-wide taxes on the accounts would be
equal to economy-wide transfers into the accounts.
Thus the government would have no incentive to
manipulate the contribution rates and withdrawal
rates of the welfare accounts in order to ease fiscal
pressures outside the welfare state (e.g. to use tax
receipts from health accounts to finance spending
on transportation).
These equity considerations deserve careful atten-
tion. To the extent that individuals experience dif-
ferent health shocks over many years, the plan
could lead to large differences in account accumu-
lations. If illness over working life is distributed
very unequally the plan could look like a savings
account for the healthy, and self-insurance for the
ill. In order to investigate how equally medical
expenses are distributed over working life Eichner
et al. (1996) use health insurance claims data to
calculate the effects of a health account system.
They show that medical expenses over an entire
working life are more evenly distributed than is
often assumed. More than eighty percent of the
people in the sample would retain over 50 percent
of their contributions. Only five percent would
retain less than 20 percent of their contributions.
Thus, although the inequality issue may not be as
large as some have imagined, some people would
undoubtedly be seriously disadvantaged in the
absence of taxes and transfers on health accounts.
The health accounts could finance all types of
health problems, ranging from short-term illness to
disability. The deductible could be applied on an
annual basis, or perhaps even over a longer period.
Other examples of savings-account based social
insurance
Unemployment savings account
An unemployment savings account has been dis-
cussed in several countries (e.g. Orszag and
Snower 1997).As noted above this already exists in
Brazil and Chile. Such schemes are essentially
defined contribution variants of the quite preva-
lent defined benefit severance pay systems for
unemployment which exist in many countries.
In the most simple version, each employee saves a
fraction of her wage on the individual unemploy-
ment savings account.As in the case of the educa-
tional account contributions can be split between
the employee and the employer. If the individual
loses her job she may withdraw an amount from
the account that corresponds to unemployment
compensation in traditional systems.If the funds in
the account are not sufficient to pay the benefit,
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the government lends the necessary amount. At
retirement a positive balance on the account can
be withdrawn, or used to top up pensions.The gov-
ernment cancels the debt of those who reach
retirement age with negative account balances.
With this system all unemployed individuals
receive the same cash amounts during spells of
unemployment as they would under existing unem-
ployment insurance rules. Their full protection is
thus maintained.Any person who expects to retire
with a positive balance completely internalizes the
cost of unemployment benefits. For individuals
who expect to retire with negative balances addi-
tional unemployment has no greater personal cost
than in current unemployment insurance.
Therefore an unemployment savings account will
have little effect if unemployment over a lifetime is
concentrated to a small group of individuals who
also tend to end up with negative balances on their
account. But if unemployment spells more com-
monly affect people who work most of their life
and expect to end up with a positive balance, then
the account can lead to substantial reduction of
public outlays for unemployment insurance and
improved incentives.
In order to study this question empirically
Feldstein and Altman (1998) analyzed how
Americans represented in the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics would have fared under an
unemployment savings account system. The analy-
sis indicates that merely five percent of employees
would retire or die with negative account balances,
and that only about half of all benefits from the
savings account would be paid to such individuals.
Most individuals have positive account balances
even after their unemployment spell. In the end
the unemployment account would save more than
60 percent of the current tax-payer burden, not
counting dynamic effects due to improved incen-
tives. Further, effects on income distribution are
shown to be quite small.
Educational savings account
In Sweden an educational savings account has
been debated and, in fact, embraced by several
political parties, labour unions and employers. A
number of firms have introduced educational sav-
ings accounts on a voluntary basis.A recent evalu-
ation indicated that they were working well
(Hansson och Färm 2002). In Great Britain so
called “educational learning accounts” were intro-
duced decoupled from employers. They have since
been temporarily suspended due to an increasing
problem with misuse of funds.
The problem that an educational savings account
aims to solve is that a growing group of people
need additional education throughout their career.
Employers’ willingness to pay such education is
often below what is socially optimal because of the
risk that the employee will leave with the human
capital investment, perhaps to a competing firm.
Most people’s own financing of such education is
limited by liquidity. Also student loans are often
not enough to finance education and living expens-
es later in life when many have high expenses for
children and housing.The need for complementary
education cannot be easily met by public subsidies
because experience shows that such offers are
often taken up by people who seek a break rather
than an investment in their future career.
The basic idea of an educational savings account is
that employees and employers contribute to the
individual savings account. Contributions to the
account should be tax free. Savings on the account
can be used to finance education and income sup-
port during education. Withdrawals that are made
to finance the costs of education are tax free, while
withdrawals that are made for income support are
taxed as income. The balance on the account at
retirement can be freely withdrawn or used to bol-
ster one´s pension. When an employee changes
employer she takes the account with her, but
retains only the part contributed by herself, while
the employer retains his/her contributions.
A comprehensive welfare account
While a piecemeal approach to introducing savings
accounts into social insurance probably is the only
practically and politically possible way, there has
been some interest in a more comprehensive sav-
ings account based social insurance. In Singapore,
for example, the Central Provident Fund was orig-
inally designed to increase savings and to provide
retirement security. But it has since been extended
with a number of schemes, e.g. saving for medical
needs, financing of higher education, insurance of
dependents and other social needs (Asher 1994).
But could such a comprehensive welfare account
perform the tasks expected in a welfare state? Inorder to analyze this question we examined a lon-
gitudinal database of 100,000 Swedes, simulating a
switch to welfare account that would provide pen-
sions, sick leave, unemployment insurance,
parental leave, housing benefits, child benefits and
social assistance.This has been reported in detail in
Fölster, Gidehag, Orszag and Snower (2002).
We find that under fairly general assumptions, if
accounts were introduced in Sweden, only a small
number of individuals would have negative bal-
ances. Under the proposed reform, it is this small
group that would be the beneficiary of the govern-
ment’s redistributive policy. Because accounts
would allow redistribution based on wealth levels
rather than period by period income, they would
be cheaper to finance and hence the payroll tax
burden on the economy would be lower.
We have developed a projection model to simulate
the likely effect of accounts. If the unemployment
rate remains the same as at present, then our
results suggest that accounts would be associated
with considerably lower marginal taxes on labor.
The gains are even greater if positive employment
effects of lower marginal taxation are taken into
account.
Conclusion
Health accounts and other types of welfare
accounts are gradually coming to use in a number
of countries. Considerable evidence suggests that
they can improve economic incentives, and help to
provide insurance in a more efficient way.
As the experience of the British educational
accounts shows, however, careful attention has to
be paid to a number of design issues. One is that
funds on the accounts must be managed in a way
that minimizes the risk of misuse or withdrawals
for purposes other than those intended. A second
important design feature concerns the insurance
element in accounts. Should it be possible to have
a negative balance on the account? Under what
circumstances should these loans be forgiven?
Undoubtedly there will be some experimentation
with various designs, and not all will work perfect-
ly from the start. That should not stop more from
trying.
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